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Abstract 
To say that thought is intentional is to say that thought is 
directed to some object. Objects to which thought is directed are 
problematic: unlike the objects of physical acts - like hitting -
they need not exist in reality: I may think of a unicorn, or imagine 
a centaur, even though such objects do not exist. However, in most 
cases my thoughts are directed to existing objects: I may think 
of President Carter or I may envy Mrs Thatcher. In such cases the 
object of my thought is none other than the existing individual that 
might also be the object of a physical act such as hitting or kicking. 
A theory of intentionality must allow us to say both that 
thought can succeed in achieving objective reference and that the 
objects of thought need not exist in reality. Brentano's essential 
insight was to show that the latter - the possible non-existence of 
the object - is the distinctive feature of the mental. However, 
he saw this as a problem concerning the ontological status of objects 
of thought, which he attempted to resolve by ascribing to such 
objects a mode of "existence-in-the-mind", thereby denying that 
mental acts can succeed in achieving objective reference. This pro-
blem can be avoided however if intentionality is seen as a feature 
of language rather than of phenomena. On the linguistic version of 
the intentionality thesis, the criteria for intentionality are stated 
as logical features of the sentences lie use to talk about the 
psychological. 
We can assert both that thought can succeed in achieving 
objective reference that the objects of thought need not exist 
in reality, by appealing to Frege's notion of sense. This means 
that the semantical frame"1ork for our theory of intentionality 
must be the Fregean three-levelled framework consisting of sign, 
sense and referent. In terrC~.s of this framework, "objective reference~~, 
~>hich is a possibility in the case of the mental, must be understood 
in terns of Fr·PctP's notion of reference as that which is mediated 
by sense; the distinctive feature of the psychological- viz., 
possible non-existence of the object - must be understood by appeal 
to the Fregean semantic model of signs which have a sense but which 
do not refer to anything. 
Serious problems arise for a theory of intentionality when 
the notion of "objective reference" is explicated without appeal 
to Frege 1 s notion of sense. For example, if "objective reference 11 
is characterised in terms of the Russellian two-levelled semantical 
framework which admits only sign and referent, then we are forced 
to deny the intentionality of some or, perhaps 1 all psychological 
acts. Alternatively, if we attempt to maintain the irreducibility 
of the intentional, then there are seemingly intractable problems 
in providing a coherent account of the intentionality of acts which 
£9. succeed in achieving objective reference, when "objective referencen 
is characterised in the absence of the notion of sense. 
It has been argued by some philosophers including Quine and 
Putnan, that sense is itself a "mentalistic 11 notion~ a notion tied 
to a mentalistic theory of meaning. If this objection can be 
sustained, then a theory of the intentionality of the mental which 
appeals to the notion of sense, will be circular. This kind of 
objection exposes a serious shortcoming in Frege's own theory of sense. 
Frege provides us with no theory of how it is that sense, which is a 
means to reference, relates to the mind. To meet the charge of 
umen talism 11 which is levelled against Frege 's theory of sense, we 
must.supplement his account with a theory of how sense (or meaning) 
can be both "mind-related" and the means to objective reference. 
This s~pplementation can be provided by H~sserJ's theory of intention-
ality.Husserl's acco~nt of the intentionality of consciousness, and 
the theory of linguistic meaning and reference which is a consequence 
of this account, allows us to treat Fregean sense as an intentional 
notion; one that is thereby both mind-related and the means to 
objective reference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The intentionality of the mental means the object-directedness 
of thought. Brentano, the acknowledged source of recent approaches 
to intentionality, explains this by saying 
In presentation something is presented, in judgement something 
is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired, and so on.l 
Reflection upon the history of the concept of intentionality 
since Brentano reveals a paradox: For certain post-Wittgensteinian 
philosophers of the British analytical tradition, 2 the thesis that 
thought is intentional is seized upon as a way of defeating the 
mentalistic consequences of Cartesian dualism, viz., that thought 
and its objects are private, introspectible events and items which 
exist in the mind. To assert that thought is intentional is to 
claim that mental phenomena can succeed in achieving objective 
reference. This is attested to by the fact that the language 
we use to describe the object of thought in, for example, A's 
thinking of President Carter, succeeds in referring to some existing 
individual and not to some private object which exists in the mind. 
On the other hand, what is distinctive about the objects to 
which mental phenomena are directed is that they need not exist in 
reality. I may imagine a unicorn or think of Pegasus, even though 
such objects do not exist. Brentano himself was concerned with the 
kind of existence that might be ascribed to thought-of unicorns, 
imagined-centaurs, and other non-existent objects of thought. This 
concern led him to the mentalistic conclusion that the objects to 
which mental phenomena are directed are 11 intentionally in-existent" 
objects - objects which are immanent to the mental act and which, 
therefore, exist in the mind. 
The paradox then, is that, from the intentionality of the 
mental, some philosophers {including Brentano) have drawn mentalistic 
consequences, whereas other philosophers (the post-Wittgensteinians) 
have drawn the opposite conclusion. 
l. Brentano (1874), p. 88. 
2. The protagonists of the ''analytic'' or ''linguistic'' versions of 
intentionality referred to here include Kenny, Anscombe, Geach. 
Although these conclusions are inco~patible, the premisses from 
which each is derived are not inherently inconsistent with one another. 
(i) The linguistic philosophers give pri~acy to the following: 
Mental pheno~ena can succeed in achieving objective reference 
(ii) Brentano gives proninence to the following: 
Mental phenonena are distinguished by the fact that their objects 
need not exist (Thesis II). 
A satisfactory theory of intentionality must incorporate both of 
these theses. That is to say, our account of "objective referenceu 
in Thesis I nust still be consistent with Thesis II, so that we can 
preserve what is distinctive about the mental; our account of "possible 
non-existence" in Thesis II >nust still be consistent with Thesis I, 
so that we can avoid a mentalistic theory of objects of thought. 
The central claim of this thesis is that it is only by appeal 
to Freqe's notion of sense that a satisfactory theory of intentionality 
can be constructed. Chapter I provides the background to this 
claim by shm;ing, first, why it is that Brentano's own theory of 
intentionality leads inescapably to a mentalistic theory of objects 
of thought, and, second, how this unwelcome consequence can be avoided 
if intentionality is understood as a feature of language rather than 
as a feature of phenomena. Chisholm's re-fornulation of Brentano's 
intentionality thesis in terms of logical features of the sentences 
we use to talk about the psychological allows us to construe the 
question of objective reference (in as a question about 
reference rather than, as for Brentano, an ontological 
question about "modes of being"~ At the same time, the linguistic 
re-formulation of Brentano's thesis introduces new considerations and 
criteria concerning the language we use to talk about the psychological. 
These are the Fregean-derived criteria for the intensionality of 
language which, for Frege, are to be understood by appeal to his 
notion of sense. 
In Chapter II we see explicitly what is involved in an appeal 
to Frege's notion of sense. Such an appeal corr®its us to accepting 
a three-levelled semantical framework consisting of sign, sense and 
referent. In terms of this framework, reference is always mediated 
by sense. Furthermore, it is a framework whichcommitsus to admitting 
signs (i.e., names) which have a sense but '"hich do not refer to 
xi 
anything. The Fregean semantical framework is contrasted with Russell's 
two-levelled semantical framework consisting only of sign (i.e., 
na:11e) and referent, In terms of the Rossellian framework reference 
is unmediated by sense; r.ames necessarily refer to some existing 
thing. (There can be no signs i.e,., names, which lack a refere:1ce). 
If we invoke the Fregean three-levelled semantical framework to ex-
plicate intentionality, then "objective reference'' in Thesis I is 
to be understood as that which is ~ediated by sense; because, within 
the Fregean framework we can admit signs which have a sense but which 
do not refer to anything, we can also allow for "possible non-existence 
of objects of thought' in Frege provides us with the 
appropriate semantical framework for saying both that mental phenomena 
can succeed b achieving objective reference (Thesis I) that they 
may fail to do so (Thesis II). But, in both cases, it is the notion 
of sense which is crucial~ 
Problems arise for a theory of intentionality if we accept 
the Russellian two-levelled framework in place of the Fregean one in 
explicating objective reference in These proble~s are 
discussed in Chapter III in connection with the relational theory 
of thoughts about existing objects. This theory derives from 
Russell's theory of names, The logical consequence of this approach 
to objective reference in Thesis I is the reduction of the mental to 
the physical and, ultimately, the repudiation of the intentional 
altogether. 
Problems of a different kind arise for the "irreducibility 
theorists" when Fregean sense is {either explicitly or implicitly) 
ignored. These theorists endorse Chisholm's claim {derived fran 
Brentano) that intentionality is irreducible - sentences about the 
mental cannot be translated into sentences about the physical. The 
problems for the irreducibility theorist arise frorr. the attempt to 
say both that intentionality is distinctive of all and only rr.ental 
phenomena and that the object of a mental act can be 11 objective 11 in 
precisely the same way that the object of a physical act is 11 0bjectiven. 
The difficulties for the irreducibility theorist are exemplified in 
Anscombe's attempts to provide an account of the intentionality of 
perception. These are discussed in Chapter IV. •rhis discussion 
serves to make explicit some of the presuppositions involved in 
Anscombe's setting up of the problems of intentionality. ~nlike the 
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relational theorists, there is nothing which is explicitly anti-
Fregean in Anscombe's account. But neither can we say that there is 
anything specifically Fregean about the framework within which 
Anscombe approaches the problem of in ten tionali ty. In a later 
discussion -Chapter VI - it eBerges that Anscombe's framework is 
fundamentally incompatible with a Fregean se.,antical framework which 
admits the notion of sense'" 
The characterisation of "objective reference" in Thesis I in 
terms of a two-levelled semantical framework (whether this be an 
explicit acceptance of a Russellian theory of reference, or an 
implicit neglect of F'rege's notion of sense) is one successful way 
of avoiding a mentalistic theory of objects of thought. But this 
success is at the expense of either (a) relinquishing the intention-
ality of those acts, or (b) creating intractable problems for an 
attempt to state that acts which ~ intentional ~ succeed in 
achieving objective reference. 
These problems are avoided if we appeal to Frege's notion of 
sense in affirning Theses I and II.. To nake this claim, however, 
we must be able to meet an objection raised by certain post-Fregean 
philosophers of language - ., that the notion of sense is tied 
to a mentalistic theory of meaning. Quine, for example, argues that 
senses or intensions (i.e~, meanings) are entities which exist in te 
mind. A ~ore serious objection is raised by Putnam who argues that, 
because senses or intensions are 'tmind-related 11 (i.e 6, what is 
grasped in an act of understanding the Beaning of a term), meaning 
qua sense has merely psychological status. If Putnam's argu~ent 
is justified, then the Fregean thesis that reference is determined 
by sense must be seen as a "psychologistic" theory of the deternina-
tion of reference: one which holds that reference is determined 
by "merely psychological" considerations. Our task in Chapter V will 
be to specify precisely what kind of "men::alistic" theory is ascribed 
to Frege by these critics. Here we will see that in order to meet 
the charge of rr.entalism we must, on Frege's behalf, be able to offer 
an account of how sense (i.e., meaning)· relates to the mind without 
thereby introducing a psychologistic theory of meaning and reference. 
Frege himself does not provide us with such a theory, although 
as a committed adversary of psychologism, he would certainly have 
resisted these criticisms~ In order to counter the accusation of 
mentalism, therefore, it is necessary to supplement Frege 1 s theory 
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of sense with a non-psychologistic theory of the way in which sense 
or meaning can be at once "mind-related" and a means to objective 
reference. In Chapter VI it will be argued that this supplementation 
is to be provided by Husserl's phenomenological account of linguistic 
meaning and reference which is based on his theory of the intention-
ality of acts of consciousness. Husserl's theory of linguistic 
meaning and reference is proposed as part of a deliberate attack on 
psychologistic theories of meaning. In Husserl's theory, a 
psychological approach to meaning is replaced by a phenomenological 
one. The semantical framework for his theory of meaning and reference 
is the Fregean three-levelled one, in which reference is mediated 
by meaning, and in which signs (names) which have a meaning but which 
do not refer to anything are admitted. For Husserl, however, the 
semantical framework of name, meaning, referent is one which results 
from his theory of the intentionality of acts of consciousness - a 
theory which tells us that, to every act, there corresponds a meaning-
content through which some object is intended. In terms of this 
theory, the ''mind-relatedness'' of linguistic meaning or sense is to 
be explained by saying that the latter is an intentional notion -
one tied to the intentionality of acts. At the same time, the 
meaning (or ''noema'') of an intentional act is the means by which 
we intend something objective. Husserl's theory of intentionality 
provides us with a non-psychologistic account of the way in which 
Fregean sense can be both mind-related and a "vehicle for objective 
l 
reference 11 • 
l. Olafson (1975), p. 76: "Intentionality is .•. the basic vehicle 
of objective reference generally and thus of our knowledge of the 
0orld which Husserl speaks of as a comprehensive intentional object." 
